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Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”:
Stereotypical Beliefs Linger,
But How Far Can the Police Go?
BY BENNETT L. GERSHMAN

T

he power of police to detain persons for a brief period to investigate suspected criminal activity –
commonly known as “stop-and-frisk” – has always been one of the most contentious issues in law
enforcement.1 Although there is general consensus that
street stops are an important weapon in crime prevention, the belief has always existed that stop-and-frisk
tactics are often used indiscriminately and abusively
against minority groups.2
The extent to which race is used by police as a proxy
for criminal behavior is difficult to measure. At one extreme, there is little question that a person’s race may
properly be considered when it is part of a description
given by a victim of a suspect.3 At the other extreme, the
stereotypical belief that a person’s race makes him more
likely to engage in criminal conduct is an entirely different matter. Clearly, as one circuit court of appeals explained: “If law enforcement . . . takes steps to initiate an
investigation of a citizen based solely upon that citizen’s
race, without more, then a violation of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred.”4
The perception by minority groups that police employ stop-and-frisk in a racially discriminatory manner
is widespread. One study found that nearly half of all
African-Americans “consider ‘police brutality and harassment . . . a serious problem’ in their own community.”5 In an informal survey of 100 young black and
Hispanic men living in New York City, 81 reported having been stopped and frisked by police at least once;
none of these stops resulted in arrests.6 Even law enforcement officials concede the existence of substantial
racial bias by police officers toward minority citizens. A
recent survey of 650 officers in the Los Angeles Police
Department found that 25% believed that racial bias on
the part of officers toward minorities existed and contributed to the negative interaction between police and
the community.7
This perception of racial bias is grounded in reality.
Statistics on street stops in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and St. Petersburg, Florida, demonstrate
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a pattern of disproportionate stops of minorities.8 And a
New Jersey state court’s 1996 finding of disproportionate traffic stops of minority motorists9 led the U.S. Department of Justice to appoint a monitor to oversee the
actions of the New Jersey State Police.10 The American
Bar Association has recommended mandatory data collection by law enforcement departments for the purpose
of investigating the increasing incidence of police officers’ “racial profiling.”11
Most recently, an unprecedented investigation by the
New York State attorney general’s office documented
the racially disparate stop-and-frisk practices of the
New York City Police Department.12 The attorney general’s report was based on a quantitative analysis of approximately 175,000 police forms (UF-250s) that police
officers are required to complete after “stop” encounters. The forms covered stops that occurred in 1998 and
the first three months of 1999. The report found that
blacks were more than six times more likely to be
stopped than whites, and Hispanics were more than
four times more likely to be stopped than whites.13 Such
disparities were most pronounced in precincts where
the majority of the population was white.14 The report
also found that in many of these stops, the police lacked
a sufficient factual basis to justify the action,15 and that
race apparently affected the decision to make the stop.16
The reported demographics of crime necessarily
complicates the analysis of differential stop rates based
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on race.17 It is commonly believed that a disproportionate number of violent crimes (i.e., aggravated assault,
robbery, rape, and murder) are committed by persons
who are black.18 It is therefore not surprising, although
regrettable, that some law enforcement officials might
use race as a statistical predictor of a person’s likelihood
to engage in criminal activity. Many courts addressing
the claim of improper racial stereotyping allow this use
of race as a factor in deciding whether to detain and
question a person, so long as the officer’s decision is reasonably related to efficient law enforcement and not undertaken for purposes of racial harassment.
The willingness of the courts to tolerate “reasonable”
racially discriminatory conduct by the police is illustrated by United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,19 where the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a vehicle stop, interrogation, and search at a highway checkpoint 30 miles north
of the Mexico-U.S. border based in part on the motorist’s apparent Mexican ancestry. The Court said that
“to the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent
Mexican ancestry, . . . that reliance clearly is relevant to
the law enforcement need to be served.”20 Lower courts
also have condoned police stops of persons who appear
to be “out of place” given their race and the racial
makeup of the neighborhood where they are found. A
good example is State v. Dean,21 where the Arizona
Supreme Court stated: “[T]he fact that a person is obviously out of place in a particular neighborhood is one of
several factors that may be considered by an officer and
the court in determining whether an investigation and
detention is reasonable and therefore lawful.”22
To be sure, a person’s race may appropriately be considered when it is relevant to the investigation. For example, singling out racial minorities for stops based on
a victim’s description does not suggest impermissible
racial targeting, for in such cases a suspect’s race is used
in the same manner as any other descriptive detail such
as height, weight, or distinctive clothing. Thus, in Brown
v. City of Oneonta,23 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of claims by minority residents
who alleged that police investigating an attack on an elderly woman unlawfully singled out hundreds of black
men for detention and questioning. The court noted that
these individuals were not questioned solely on the
basis of their race but on the permissible basis of a physical description given by the victim of the crime.24 As the
court stated: “The description is not a suspect classification, but rather a legitimate classification of suspects.”25
The court added that it was not unmindful of the impact
of the investigation on police-community relations, nor
was the court “blind to the sense of frustration that was
doubtlessly felt by those questioned by the police during this investigation.”26
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Remedies When Race Is Used Impermissibly
Assuming, however, that police use race impermissibly as a signal of increased risk of criminality, what legal
remedies are available, and how should courts analyze
the claim?
Constitutional remedies include the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizures and
searches and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
Equal Protection. Both claims could be asserted in a
criminal proceeding, typically by a motion to suppress
evidence acquired following a stop that culminates in an
arrest and search, or in a Civil Rights Action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for an injunction or monetary damages.
The issues in both proceedings would be (1) whether the
police officer detained the individual without a sufficient level of objective, factual suspicion, and (2)
whether the police officer detained the individual, in
part, because of his or her race.27
Under a Fourth Amendment claim, the petitioner
must allege sufficient facts to show that he or she was
detained by the police without reasonable suspicion.
Detention constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure
when the police restrain someone by means of physical
force or show of authority under circumstances that
would convey to a reasonable person the belief that he
was not free to leave.28 Under an equal protection theory, the petitioner must allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the police intentionally stopped him because of his race in circumstances where race was not
relevant to the investigation.29
A Fourth Amendment challenge would be difficult to
sustain even in cases where police impermissibly used
race as a factor in making the stop. The Supreme Court
has held that in cases involving pretextual behavior by
the police, such as stopping motorists for minor traffic
violations in order to search the vehicle for drugs, the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant; the issue is whether
the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.30 Thus,
even assuming a stop predicated on the officer’s subjective use of the suspect’s race to indicate an increased
risk of criminality, the Fourth Amendment issue would
be whether facts existed apart from the suspect’s race to
demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.31 Where, however, the police seek to justify arguably race-conscious conduct by offering raceneutral reasons, a court should be encouraged to take a
hard look at the facts to determine whether the officer’s
justification is credible.32
Establishing an equal protection violation based on
the selective use of race might prove more successful. A
party can demonstrate purposeful racial discrimination
by (1) alleging the existence of a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race,33 (2) pointing to a facially neutral law or policy that has been ap43

plied in a discriminatory manner,34 and (3) showing that
a facially neutral law or policy has a disproportionate
racial impact, and that it was motivated by racial bias.35
Invoking equal protection to challenge racially motivated stops must allege facts reasonably showing that
the police officer consciously considered the suspect’s
race in deciding to order the stop. A petitioner could allege that a law enforcement agency maintained a regular policy of stopping blacks and Hispanics more often
than whites when investigating crimes of violence and
weapons possession.36 Such a claim could be based on
statistical evidence of police stop rates correlated to the
suspect’s race, and adjusted for crime rate differentials
and population composition.37 For example, the documentation contained in the New York State attorney
general’s report might provide the necessary evidence
to establish a prima facie case that the New York City Police Department maintains a racially discriminatory
stop-and-frisk policy.38 Although the report did not
draw such a conclusion expressly, the inference was inescapable.
Once a party makes a prima facie showing that race
was a motivating factor in the officer’s decision, then
under equal protection doctrine the government has the
burden of rebutting the claim by showing the existence
of neutral, non-racial reasons that motivated the action.39 As with any equal protection claim supported by
evidence that the government’s conduct was motivated
by racial considerations, a court must scrutinize the
claim strictly.40 Under this strict standard of review, the
government faces a heavy burden to show that its conduct served a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal.41

Conclusion
There is an increasing awareness among courts, commentators, and the public that race plays a critical role
in police stop-and-frisk decisions.42 The report by the
New York State attorney general’s office presents compelling evidence that race has played a dominant role in
the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk
practices. The report documents what for many years
New Yorkers have assumed: that too many police officers equate a person’s race with criminal behavior and
act on that belief. When presented with such a claim,
courts should take a very hard look at the government’s
justification for its actions. There is no place in constitutional law or criminal justice for a theory of “reasonable” racial discrimination.
1.
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In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the landmark opinion
legitimizing the practice, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Fourth Amendment does not bar police from stopping a person for questioning, and frisking that person
for weapons, when the officer has a reasonable, articula-
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ble suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, even though
the officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest. New
York courts apply a more stringent, multi-level approach
to stop-and-frisk. The first, least intrusive level, allows
police to request information about a person’s identity
and reason for being in a particular location where the request is supported by an objective, credible reason. The
second level, referred to as the “common-law right to inquire,” allows the officer to conduct more intensive questioning, although not detaining the individual, when the
officer has a “founded suspicion” that criminal activity is
afoot. The third level authorizes a stop and frisk when
based on reasonable suspicion that a particular person
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime. The fourth level allows the police to make an arrest based on probable cause. See People v. De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 (“‘[i]n many communities, field
interrogations are a major source of friction between the
police and minority groups.’”) (quoting President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 183-84 (1967), which
documents the belief by minority groups that police stops
are conducted “indiscriminately” and “abusively”).
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15. Id. at 162 (noting that in more than one out of every
seven stops, when the police officer filled out the mandated UF-250 form documenting the stop, the officer’s rationale for the stop failed to meet the constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion).
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It should also be noted that behind the high rates of
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